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Federal Double Jeopardy Policy
Jay A. Sigler*
In this article, Professor Sigler analyzes the present state of federal
double jeopardy law. He illustrates the need for clarification and revi-
sion within each of the five separate policy situations, examining the
substantive principles developed in the case law, and concludes with
a plea for legislative and judicial response to relate the. law to modern
social policy needs.
I. INTODUCrON
The fifth amendment provision against double jeopardy is one of
the basic protections afforded defendants by the United States Con-
stitution. Its roots are found in early common law,' and the policies
which it represents have been gradually defined by federal courts to
meet various situations of inequality in the position of a criminal de-
fendant confronted by federal prosecuting attorneys. Presently the
double jeopardy provision is not incorporated by the fourteenth
amendment as a restriction upon state action, but this condition may
not prevail much longer. Should double jeopardy become incorporated
into the "due process" clause of the fourteenth amendment, states
will be forced to consider the total body of federal double jeopardy
policies. And even if incorporation is delayed, "an overview of federal
policy in the area is needed.
Recently, one state court assumed that the fifth amendment double
jeopardy provision was applicable to state prosecutions 2 In 1964 the
Supreme Court, in Malloy v. Hogan,3 found the fifth amendment self-
incrimination clause applicable to state proceedings thereby overruling
two significant cases.4 Other Supreme Court decisions have extended
the federal Bill of Rights into related areas of criminal procedure.5
There is, therefore, a good chance that double jeopardy may become
incorporated as well.6 Thus, it becomes especially useful to perceive
the contours of federal policy in this area.
- B.A., L.L.B., M.A., Ph.D., Rutgers University; Assistant Professor of Political
Science, Rutgers University.
1. See Sigler, A History of Double Jeopardy, 7 Am. J. of LEG. HisT. 283 (1963).
2. People v. Laws, 29 IlM. 2d 221, 193 N.E.2d 806 (1963).
3. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
4. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78 (1908).
5. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23 (1963) (search and seizure).
6. See Henkin, Selective Incorporations in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE
L.J. 74 (1963).
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The double jeopardy clause may profitably be viewed as a series
of problems in social policy which are usually treated as a single
problem. Analyzed in this fashion, double jeopardy law is resolved
into five separate policy situations. The first situation concerns the
definition of jeopardy, and the question of when jeopardy can be said
to attach. The second situation concerns the desirability of a uniform
national policy, and is to be clearly differentiated from the third,
which involves the legal significance to be accorded traditional juris-
dictional lines. The fourth situation, the scope of the criminal act, is
the thorniest, and is most closely related to the substantive criminal
law. The final problem is that of the significance to be given the
use of the criminal appeal, whether employed by the prosecution or
the defendant. These separate problems are usually treated together
under the rubric "double jeopardy," tending to confuse an already
complicated concept.
II. DEFINIION OF JEOPAIRDY-WIIEN JEOPABDY ATrAcis
Once the double jeopardy clause had become an accepted part of
American constitutions, the phrase "life or limb" began to receive
an interpretation broad enough to apply the protection to any criminal
penalty, so that the threat of death or mutilation was removed as a
necessary element of the doctrine.7 While this development was fairly
obvious, the further implications of double jeopardy required consid-
erable refinement. History provided some hints with which to guide
the judges, but the creation of double jeopardy policy was largely a
novel task.
A recent case enunciates the modern formula of federal double
jeopardy policy in broad terms:
Once acquitted or convicted of a crime for his conduct in a particular
transaction, a defendant should be able to consider the matter closed and
plan his life ahead without the threat of subsequent prosecution and pos-
sible imprisonment. 8
Other objectives of that policy might be: (1) the avoidance of
unnecessary harrassment; (2) the avoidance of social stigma incident
upon repeated criminal trials; (3) economy of time and money; (4)
psychological securityY These meanings of double jeopardy are not
derived from its history.
7. Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163 (1873). Based upon common law precedents, the
case held that both former acquittal and former conviction were comprised in the
protection to the accused.
8. United States v. Candalaria, 131 F. Supp. 797 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
9. See Comment 65 YALE L.J. 339 (1956).
10. See Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160 (1947); Fleischer v. United States,
91 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1939).
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The increasing tendency of modem penal legislation to create more
detailed and more numerous criminal offenses has further complicated
the problem of setting double jeopardy policy because it has increased
the number of offense categories which proscribe a single criminal
act.10 Now one transaction may afford the prosecution a choice of two
counts or separate indictments where only one existed previously.
This would not be inherently detrimental if the decision to create
more overlapping offenses were the fruit of a conscious legislative
policy. However, it has been left to the courts to determine the
legislative intent and, by implication, to repeal or add to the criminal
statutes. This is no easy task since it ultimately determines the
powers of the prosecutor's office.
Constitutionally, there is nothing to prevent the legislature from re-
peatedly incriminating similar acts but there is a limitation on the
judiciary, forbidding it from ordering multiple punishment when it
appears that the legislature did not so intend." The use of the judge's
sentencing power or of the executive's pardoning power may be said
to mitigate legislative duplication, 2 but these remedies occur at too
late a point in time, that is, after the defendant has been harassed by
the state and the damage has been done.
Several distinguishable factual situations account for the over-
whelming number of double jeopardy cases. These factual settings
have created disparate policy requirements. These situations may be
suggested:
1. The trial of a case is stopped at some point short of its final
termination.
2. The trial concludes with an acquittal, and the prosecution
begins another trial upon another indictment.
3. The trial ends with a conviction, and the defendant appeals
and is either later convicted of a greater offense than he was
originally indicted for, or is convicted of the same offence as well
as on other counts not contained in the original indictment.
4. The trial ends with a conviction, and the defendant is later
tried for offenses "arising out of the same transaction, but which
are technically different from the original charges, in an entirely
new proceeding.
5. Overlapping jurisdictional boundaries may result in repeated
punishments for the same act. Thus, civil-criminal distinctions,
federal-state, civilian-military, or foreign-domestic jurisdictional
11. See People v. Moore, 143 Cal. App. 2d 333, 299 P.2d 691 (1956).
12. But see Samsone v. Zerbst, 73 F.2d 670 (10th Cir. 1934), a case which, in
typical fashion avoids judicial responsibility for separation of offenses by relying
without question upon legislative determination of multiple sentencing and multiple
punishment for the same act.
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lines may cause the same action to be tried again as an offense
of a different kind, or against a different sovereign.
6. One act may constitute conduct directed at several persons
or objects. The question arises: whether each person or object
injured represents a criminally punishable act.
It is very common for judges to confuse these separate situations.
Double jeopardy law has become so tangled that in some respects the
outcome of a plea is in great doubt. Rarely will a court face the
critical policy issues which lie deep beneath the surface. This recent
policy statement is an exception:
[The provision of the Fifth Amendment against double jeopardy is]
designed to protect an individual from being subjected to the hazards of
trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense ...
[the] underlying idea ... is that the State with all its resources and power
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for
an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and
ordeal, and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and
insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he
may be found guilty.13
Approached chronologically, the first question which can arise in
double jeopardy* law is whether a prior incompleted trial had reached
such a degree of maturation as to amount to a "jeopardy." While some
early cases held to the contrary, the contention that "jeopardy"
referred only to a prior conviction or acquittal was rejected in the
federal courts because "there is a wide difference between a verdict
given and the jeopardy of a verdict," since "hazard, peril, danger,
jeopardy of a verdict cannot mean a verdict given."14 But this rule
remained unsettled as late as 1883, when it was held that in order
to bar prosecution a former conviction must be pleaded.'5 A judgment
of acquittal based on the operation of a statute of limitations as a bar
to a prior case is definitely a former jeopardy.16
Once it is agreed that jeopardy does not require a final judgment a
host of new issues arise. The most important issue is whether there
had been a sufficient amount of risk on the previous trial to amount to
a putting in jeopardy. The problem is usually referred to as the "at-
tachment of jeopardy" situation. If there has been no attachment
of jeopardy, the prior trial is treated as though it never existed and
it is blotted out of legal memory.
13. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
14. This Pennsylvania decision, Commonwealth v. Cook, 6 S. & R. 577, 596 (1822),
became the federal rationale. But in 1823, United States v. Haskell, 26 Fed. Cas.
207 (No. 15,321) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823), the federal court still adhered to the English
rule requiring final judgment.
15. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833).
16. United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916).
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Some mystifying results are produced by this theory. For example,
in a recent case, the discharge of a jury because of misconduct of a
defense counsel was held to bar a retrial.17 The trial court on its
own motion, even over defendant's objection, ordered a mistrial.
Subsequently, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the
theory that he had been placed in jeopardy. The decision was based on
the ground that "dismissing the jury in a criminal action without
defendant's consent precludes another trial except where dismissal
arises out of circumstances of necessity." As a practical matter,
defendant was acquitted virtually because the trial judge had acted
hastily in ordering a mistrial.
Despite the complications which are evident, the rule for the attach-
ment of jeopardy has been stated briefly, as follows:
[A] person has been in jeopardy when he is regularly charged with a crime
before a tribunal properly organized and competent to try him . . . Un-
doubtedly in those jurisdictions where a trial of one accused of a crime
can only be to a jury, and a verdict of acquittal or conviction must be by
a jury, no legal jeopardy can attach until a jury has been called and charged
with the deliverance of the accused.' 8
After the impanelling of the jury, jeopardy can be said to attach
when any evidence is heard, or testimony received, but before the
prosecution presents its opening argument to the jury.19 However, pre-
liminary examination by a magistrate is not a trial,20 and arraignment
and pleadings are not trials.2 ' Interestingly, Congress has provided a
double jeopardy protection for military personnel tried under "the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, but it has stipulated that only final
judgments would have the effect of prior jeopardy.P
In cases of "manifest necessity," exceptions to the attachment rule
permit the trial judge to order a new trial without confronting a double
jeopardy plea. If the jury cannot agree, or if it is illegally constituted,
there is no trial and no former jeopardy.23 A leading case confused the
doctrines of "attachment" and "waiver" by holding that where a
17. United States v. Whitlow, 110 F. Supp. 871 (D.D.C. 1953).
18. Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 128 (1904). This case is better known
for Holmes' dissent in which he proposes the concept of "continuing jeopardy" for
appeals by the federal government to be upheld.
19. Clawens v. Rives, 104 F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
20. Collins v. Loisel, 262 U.S. 426 (1922).
21. Bassing v. Cady, 208 U.S. 386 (1907).
22. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 44, 70A S tat. 52, 10 U.S.C. § 844 (1964);
S. Rm'. No. 486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1949); H.R, REP. No. 491, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. 23 (1949). This rule was upheld as not violative of the fifth amendment
when applied by a military tribunal, United States v. Zimmrman, 2 C.M.R.. 66
(1952). "
23. United States v. Perez, .22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824),.. : . ,
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conviction was set aside on appeal there had been no jeopardy. 4
Other instances of "manifest necessity" are a juror's acquaintance
with the accused, 25 irregularity in the indictment, absence of wit-
nesses for tactical military reasons,27 illness of a juror, termination of
a court term and other emergencies or unusual circumstances. 29 A
double jeopardy plea was not permitted, when the previous trial
resulted in a mistrial because the state's witnesses pleaded self-incrimi-
nation.P However, no "manifest necessity" was discerned sufficient to
meet a claim of jeopardy having attached when, on the original action,
the prosecution had been unable to secure the presence of needed
witnesses.
3'
Generally stated, necessity intervening after attachment mitigates
against the operation of double jeopardy.32 The exceptions are legion.
The tendency of the appellate courts to leave the discretion of the
trial judge undisturbed has been marked. If the judge at the first trial
senses the necessity of premature termination, perhaps it is not de-
sirable to permit a defendant to utilize his double jeopardy plea. The
dimensions of the "manifest necessity" exception are definitely, if not
logically, indicated by the cases.
Several recent decisions have sought to clarify and simplify the
rules concerning attachment. In the most important decision,
Downum v. United States,3 it was held that a second trial was barred
where, because of the prosecutor's failure to find a principal witness,
the original trial judge dismissed the jury before any evidence had
been introduced. In Gori v. United States,4 the trial judge had
declared a mistrial in order to protect the defendant from irrelevant
and prejudicial testimony. On retrial a conviction was obtained and
was not considered double jeopardy since the judge was acting in the
24. Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905); CoRwIN, TAE CONSnTUTION AND
WHAT IT MF-xs TODAY 213 (1958) (makes the same error, which confuses separate
problems).
25. Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891).
26. Lovato v. New Mexico, 242 U.S. 199 (1916).
27. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949).
28. United States v. Potash, 118 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1941).
29. Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894).
30. Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424 (1953).
31. Correro v. United States, 48 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1931). Contra United States v.
Coolidge, 25 Fed. Cas. 622 (No. 14) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
32. Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1949).
33. 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
34. 367 U.S. 364 (1961). In Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1961),
reversing sub. nom., In re United States, 286 F.2d 556 (1st Cir. 1961), the trial judge,
having discovered that during the recess of a long and complicated trial the prosecu-
tion had refreshed the memory of a witness, called upon the jury to render an
acquittal of the defendant. The judge thus aborted the case and caused jeopardy to
attach, barring a retrial. The Supreme Court insisted on a distinction between the
effects of a mistrial (not effecting jeopardy) and an acquittal (which does).
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defendant's interest even though over his objection. Although the
facts of the cases are irreconcilable, the decisions can be reconciled
on the ground that the trial judge's determination regarding the impact
of questioning and testimony upon a jury is less reviewable than his
decision regarding the prosecutor's failure to proceed with trial.
However, where the trial judge forces a plea of guilty upon a
defendant, a new trial is not barred by double jeopardy.- It seems,
then, that judicial animosity towards the defendant is to be treated
differently than a prosecutor's animosity towards the defendant, be-
cause of the supposed neutral tole of the judge.
Despite these cases, the doctrine of "manifest necessity" remains
confused.w The states differ considerably in their views concerning
the attachment of jeopardy. The Supreme Court has held as a matter
of due process, that a state need not abandon jurisdiction for reasons
of double jeopardy because mob violence has rendered a trial abor-
tive.3 7 The Court will defer to state law when it permits a new trial
in cases where the federal law as to attachment of jeopardy would
produce a different result.8 The case of Palko v. Connecticut has been
relied upon as a source for this permissive attitude, as long as the
criminal defendant is not subjected to "unendurable hardship", or a
violation of some "fundamental principle of liberty and justice."39
A closely related problem, although rarely treated as such, is that
of post conviction sentencing. In such cases it is usually held that
jeopardy has not yet attached because the sentencing process is a
part of the original trial. It has been held that a second sentence
entered after the reversal of a previous sentence, but without a second
trial, is no violation of due process, nor does it place a defendant in
double jeopardy.40 Here, correction of a mandatory legal penalty is
not double jeopardy and should not give a defendant his release.41
The accumulation of sentences does not amount to a putting in double
jeopardy "and a single sentence for several offenses, in excess of that
prescribed for one offense, may be authorized by statute."4'
It is possible to dissect the attachment cases and discover certain
policy features which usually escape the eye. The following compet-
ing social interests are at stake:
35. United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964).
36. See Kaminsky, Double Jeopardy and the Doctrine of Manifest Necessity, 20
INTnAmAL L. REv. 189, 200 (1965).
37. Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
38. Brock v. North Carolina, supra note 30.
39. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
40. Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155 (1900).
41. Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160 (1947).
42. Carter v. McClaughry 183 U.S. 365, 394 (1902).
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1. The interest in permitting the prosecution to have full and
complete opportunity to present all the evidence that the state
has available, and in preventing an accused from going free solely
by virtue of the operation of the double jeopardy clause, regard-
less of the merits of the case.
2. The interest in preventing the prosecution from harassing a
defendant with repeated trials, any of which may be terminated
at the whim of the prosecution. Two considerations are:
(a) the moral impropriety of permitting the state a second
chance to prosecute an accused, and
(b) the practical effect of forcing the prosecution to pre-
pare its best case before beginning suit.
3. The interest in preventing an extraneous event, not con-
nected with the merits of a case, from interfering with the
prosecuting of a criminal matter (the justification for the excep-
tions to attachment of jeopardy).
A more realistic and workable distinction in this area would be
between extrinsic and intrinsic factors in the presentation of a case
which prevent the case from being carried to its normal conclusion.
Using this formula, when a case is halted by an event not caused by
the defense or the prosecution it should be retried. In those cases
where the intervening event is caused by the prosecution, and policy
requires the single presentation of the prosecution's case, it can be
determined as a factual matter whether the prosecution had a rea-
sonable opportunity to present the state's best case. If the inter-
vening factor is caused by the defendant, he should not be heard to
object. This suggestion could help eliminate the arbitrary character of
this branch of law.
III. DvsmaBnrrY OF A Umvoam NATIONAL POLICY
Another aspect of federal double jeopardy law which deserves dis-
cussion is the social desirability of a nationally uniform or a federally
disparate system of double jeopardy. This involves some of the most
sensitive recent developments in the double jeopardy area. However,
when seen as a matter of the need for a uniform national policy,
much of the controversy which has raged over these cases dwindles
into insignificance. One of the fundamental questions raised is
whether federal double jeopardy principles bind the states through
the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
Barron v. Baltimore43 first indicated that the fifth amendment was
largely a federal concern and not a limitation upon state criminal
43. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833).
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proceedings. When the fourteenth amendments due process clause
was later substituted for this purpose, it became apparent that the
fifth amendment still did not apply to the states.4 Some earlier cases
had indicated the contrary,45 but in 1847, it was held specifically that
the double jeopardy provision did not act as a limitation upon the
use of state power.4 This is still the present rule although considerable
criticism has recently developed.47
Until 1900, the door was still open to the possibility of imposing
some standards for double jeopardy on the states as an aspect of due
process. In that year the Supreme Court hinted that states might
have varying standards, but until 1937 the Court always avoided the
question whether double jeopardy was protected by the fourteenth
amendment.48 In 1902 the Court refused to pass on the issue when it
was squarely presented. 49 By 1915 it seemed clear that "the state may
conduct successive criminal trials for the same offense" if there was
no showing "that the accused has been subjected to unendurable hard-
ships, or violations of fundamental principles of liberty and justice."50
But the basis of this case was narrow, for the Court held that to rule
otherwise would "impair the power of the states to repress and
punish crime" in a situation in which mob violence had erupted at
the first trial. Before the First World War the Supreme Court was
willing to review state criminal trials only to the extent necessary to
find that the state court had properly exercised its jurisdiction.
51
States were allowed to weaken the protection against self-incrimina-
tion52 and to alter the common law trial by jury,53 even though the
44. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
45. See State v. Moor, 1 Miss. 134 (1823); accord Phillips v. McCauley, 92 F.2d
790 (1937).
46. Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847).
47. Justices Black and Douglas hold that the federal double jeopardy clause sets the
standard for state criminal proceedings, either directly through the fifth amendment,
or indirectly through the fourteenth. Black with Douglas dissented in Ciucci v. Illinois,
356 U.S. 571 (1958); Douglas dissented with Black in Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S.
464 (1958); and Black dissented in Brock v. North Carolina, supra note 30. Black's
dissent in Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959), shows his reliance on the
negative historical inference from Partridge's proposed amendment to the original
double jeopardy clause, mentioned above.
48. Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912); Brantley v. Georgia, 217 U.S.
284 (1910); Keerl v. Montana, 213 U.S. 135 (1909); Shoerer v. Pennsylvania, 207
U.S. 188 (1907); McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311 (1901); Murphy v.
Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155 (1900); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S 189 (1898);
Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673 (1895).
49. Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1902), refused to pass upon the effect of the
fourteenth amendment upon double jeopardy, "upon which question we need not now
express an opinion."
50. Frank v. Magnum, supra note 37.
51. MAsON & BEANEY, AmnmCAN CoNsTrrmuoAi. LAw 521 (2d ed. 1959).
52. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
53. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
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Court had long since agreed that the fourteenth amendment included
certain of the first amendment freedoms. In 1937, the Supreme Court,
through Mr. Justice Cardozo, reaffirmed its previous assertions that the
entire Bill of Rights was not incorporated into the fourteenth amend-
ment. The decision in Palko v. Connecticut54 attempted to justify a
selective incorporation and had special reference to double jeopardy.
In Palko a Connecticut statute had permitted the prosecution to
appeal from the adverse rulings of the state's criminal courts, a
practice not permitted in the federal system. Palko, after having been
convicted of murder in the second degree and given a life sentence,
was retried after a successful state appeal. He was convicted of first
degree murder in the second trial and sentenced to death. Palko
appealed, claiming that he had been placed twice in jeopardy.
The United States Supreme Court held that the kind of jeopardy
to which Connecticut had subjected the defendant "would have to
create a hardship so acute and shocking as to be unendurable, and as
to violate those fundamental principles of ordered liberty which lie at
the base of all our civil and political institutions."55 In reaching this
result the Court placed double jeopardy, as well as most other protec-
tions accorded criminal defendants, on a different constitutional plane
from certain more fundamental freedoms taken over from the earlier
articles of the Bill of Rights.
In effect, each federal court must measure each claim of double
jeopardy arising out of state courts to see whether it violates funda-
mental principles of liberty and justice. The answer in the Palko
case was "no" because the state was not attempting to wear down the
defendant by a multitude of cases, but asking only "that the case
against him shall go on until there shall be a trial free from substantial
legal error."
5 6
It should be pointed out that in no case has the Supreme Court
found a due process defect in successive state criminal prosecutions for
a single offense. One may ask whether the Court has not ignored a
good many other aspects of double jeopardy policy by employing a
low standard. Mr. Justice Black has said that he fears "to see the
consequences of the Court's practice of substituting its own concepts
of decency and fundamental justice for the language of the Bill of
Rights." 7 So far as double jeopardy is concerned, Black's fears are
groundless. The Court has imposed such a high degree of self-restraint
that many state variations in double jeopardy policy are permitted.
The Palko ruling has meant a multiplicity of solutions to the prob-
54. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
55. Id. at 328.
56. Sapir v. United States, 348 U.S. 373 (1955) (by implication).
57. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
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lems of double jeopardy and, by later interpretations, prevented the
setting of national minimum standards of double jeopardy. Uniformity
of American double jeopardy law was made impossible. By withdraw-
ing federal power in the double jeopardy area the Palko decision
runs counter to a general trend toward greater Supreme Court con-
cern with defendant's rights, for "the enhancement of the relative
importance of the federal government in many aspects of criminal
law administration is one of the most significant developments in the
recent history of criminal justice in America."m
The Palko decision still represents the basic dividing line between
the states and the federal government in the double jeopardy area,
and there are prospects of its being overruled. The decision was
employed as authority in a case in which the defendant claimed that
the prosecution had sought a new trial after a mistrial had been
obtained, even though the prosecution had supposedly known that
the grounds for the mistrial had been present.59 The Palko case was
relied upon because of a supposed factual similarity, so it is not
entirely clear that dissimilar factual situations will be treated in the
same fashion. However, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the
majority decision, did say that
[A] state falls short of its obligation when it callously subjects an individual
to successive retrials on a charge on which he has been acquitted or pre-
vents a trial from proceeding to a termination in favor of the accused merely
in order to allow a prosecutor who has been incompetent or casual or
ineffective to see if he cannot do better a second time.60
As it is, a sufficiently flagrant example of harassment might result in
application of the fourteenth amendment.
What are the states permitted to do under the Palko rule? If a
statute permits, the state may appeal in case of error since "this merely
places the state in a position of equality with the defendant."61 This
is true even though the common law did not permit appeals by the
state,6 2 and even though the federal government may not have this
privilege.63 But a state may not appeal from an acquittal and obtain a
new trial in the absence of a statute, even though a defendant may be
retried after obtaining a reversal of a conviction following his own
58. Allen, The Supreme Court of the United States, Federalism and State Systems
of Criminal Justice, 8 DEPAUL L. REV. 213 (1958).
59. Brock v. North Carolina, supra note 30.
60. Id. at 499.
61. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
62. United States v. Rosenwasser, 145 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1944).
63. Kepper v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904), overruling in part United States
v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310 (1892). See United States v. Janitz, 161 F.2d 19 (3d Cir.
1947), which seems to prefer the Sanges dicta.
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appeal.6 It is settled law that there is no denial of due process
when a defendant has a conviction set aside and is later retried for the
same offense.m
A recent case involved the failure of an execution pursuant to a
death penalty. The subsequent issuance of a new death warrant was
held by the Supreme Court to be no infringement of double jeopardy.
We see no difference from a constitutional point of view between a new
trial for error of law at the instance of the state that results in a death
sentence instead of imprisonment for life and an execution that follows a
failure of equipment.
66
The reference to the Palko fact situation is really quite strained,
unless the holding is taken to mean that only the most heinous trans-
gression of a state prosecutor will be questioned in federal court.
Another case of this type held that a reversal by the Supreme Court
of a criminal conviction should be treated in the same way as a reversal
of a state court on appeal, and not to serve as a bar to a new trial by
the state.61 Similarly, the discharge of a jury after a failure to agree
upon a verdict does not bar the state from beginning a new trial, even
in the light of due process requirements.
68
The Supreme Court has rarely felt hard-pressed to approve a state's
version of double jeopardy. Some recent cases have involved such
striking state double jeopardy policies that some members of the
Court have paused for careful reflection. At times, there are signs that
a broader reconsideration may be possible.
In the Hoag69 case, the State of New Jersey indulged in the use of
multiple prosecutions with only slight variations in the offense
formulas for the purpose of obtaining multiple convictions. The
Supreme Court, in rendering a decision favorable to the state, appar-
ently felt that the desirability of leaving the states free to administer
their own criminal policies was not outweighed by the unusual severity
of the state's policy of double jeopardy. Specifically, the Court held
that the fourteenth amendment does not forbid a state from prosecut-
ing separate criminal offenses at separate trials, even though the of-
fenses may arise out of the "same criminal transaction," but the
determination of deprivation of due process must be "picked out in the
facts and circumstances of each case."10 The fourteenth amendment
does not necessarily prevent a state from allowing different offenses
64. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
65. Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155 (1900).
66. Lousiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947).
67. Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942).
'68. Keerl v. Montana, 213 U.S. 135 (1909).
169. Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
70. Id. at 466-67.
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which are phases of the same act or transgression to be prosecuted
in separate actions.
Another question considered in Hoag was whether the doctrine of
"collateral estoppel" applied to these multiple trials. This doctrine,
which normally is restricted to civil trials, requires that the determina-
tion of a question of fact essential to the judgment of a previous trial
should be conclusive in a subsequent trial involving the same parties
and the same facts. The Court indicated that the rule might be
applicable, but expressed grave doubts as to whether it is a constitu-
tional requirement.71 The broader civil doctrine of res judicata has
not yet been tested by the Court for its constitutional nature, nor has
its application to criminal actions been required as a matter of funda-
mental fairness.72 If the Court were to overturn the state's decision
in the Hoag case, it would have to supply an alternative rule, but
since no clear federal rule has emerged to solve questions of over-
lapping offense categories, no alternative is available. Neither res
judicata nor collateral estoppel, being civil doctrines, can serve as
adequate replacements of double jeopardy.73
In Ciucci v. Illinois,"4 a companion case to Hoag, the Court held
that multiple state prosecutions for four murders occurring simul-
taneously (identical offenses which had been charged in four separate
indictments) did not violate the requirements of due process. At
each trial the prosecution had introduced evidence of all four deaths.
After obtaining two convictions and two jail sentences, the prosecu-
71. Id. at 471. The Court said that "despite its wide employment we entertain
grave doubts whether collateral estoppel can be regarded as a constitutional require-
ment [because] certainly this Court has never so held." Mr. Justice Warren said
that the civil concept ought to apply: "The first jury's verdict of acquittal is merely an
illusion of justice if its legal significance is not a determination that there was at least
a reasonable doubt whether petitioner was present at the scene of the robbery,"
which was the only important contested issue. Id. at 476 (dissenting opinion). In a
case decided in 1959, Justice Brennan in a separate opinion indicated that collateral
estoppel should not apply to criminal cases: "The doctrine of collateral estoppel may
not provide adequate protection" in practice, and "furthermore, the protection of an
essentially procedural concept such as collateral estoppel . . . is less substantial than
the constitutional protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause." Abbate v. United States,
359 U.S. 187, 200 (1959).
72. Justice Holmes concluded that, even absent double jeopardy, res judicata
was applicable in criminal as well as in civil cases, United States v. Oppenheimer,
242 U.S. 85, 87 (1916). The existence of the double jeopardy provision of the fifth
amendment does not exclude the use of res judicata. See Fall v. United States, 49
F.2d 506, 511 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 867 (1931). This does not mean,
however, that res judicata will be required of the states as part of the due process
clause. See Mutual Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Tisdale, 91 U.S. 238 (1876), which
seems to indicate that it could be a due process requirement.
73. It seems to this writer that the doctrines drawn from civil procedure should be
inapplicable because of the difference of the burden of proof in criminal and civil
cases. There is no "reasonable doubt" doctrine in civil law. See Murray & Sorenson,
Inc. v. United States, 207 F.2d 119 (1st Cir. 1953).
74. 356 U.S. 571 (1958).
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tion succeeded in obtaining a death sentence. This maneuver was
sustained by the Court in a per curiam opinion which relied upon
the logic of the Hoag case, declaring that the state is entitled con-
stitutionally to prosecute individual offenses at separate trials, and
to utilize all relevant evidence even if employed at a previous trial.
If there were no showing of "fundamental unfairness" in the state's
procedure, due process would not be deemed violated.
Mr. Justice Douglas, one of four justices dissenting, stated that the
prosecution had assured a death sentence by using multiple trials,
resulting in an oppressive policy of criminal prosecution. Once again,
the Court was faced with a case in which no federal standard was
available to replace that of the state. Once again, the Supreme Court
deferred to state double jeopardy policy.
Some have explained the Hoag result as an attempt by the Supreme
Court to create a lenient rule for state prosecutions to counterbalance
the state's inability to appeal criminal cases.75 But more fundamental
policies are at stake. The important difference between Hoag and
Palko, which is ignored by the Supreme Court, is that the former
involves the prosecutor's discretion solely, while the latter involves
the deliberate choice of a state legislature to permit criminal appeals.
In both cases the Supreme Court failed to impose federal double
jeopardy through the due process clause. The fears of Mr. Justice
Black have not been realized, for the Court has not substituted its
version of concepts of decency and fundamental fairness for the
language of the Bill of Rights. Instead, it has failed to act in the
double jeopardy area, failed to impose its standards, because it has
not yet decided what those standards should be.
The selective incorporation approach of the Palko case has the
merit of permitting a pragmatic case by case testing of each claim of
federal double jeopardy raised in a state court. As a practical matter,
though, it has led to a deference to the judgments of state courts and
to the actions of state prosecutors as well as to the policies of state
legislatures. Once the federal double jeopardy law is itself clarified
there may be a reconsideration of the requirements which federal
double jeopardy imposes upon the states.
IV. CoNFLIrT BETWEEN JURISDICrIONAL LINES
The next problem area to be considered is that of the conflict of
jurisdictional lines. On one level, this issue concerns the delicate
interrelationship between the jurisdiction of state and federal govern-
ments. On another level, the lines drawn between the civil and
75. Mayers & Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74
HARv. L. REv. 1, 37 (1960).
[ VOL. 19
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
military areas and the civil and criminal areas deserve attention. It is
helpful to treat these problems in the same way because the courts
have tended to evolve similar legal rules with respect to them. The
policy issue involved is the significance to be accorded traditional
jurisdictional distinctions for the purposes of double jeopardy. The
cases which fall into this category pose the question: "Is the line
drawn between this and that zone so significant that it should permit
a man to be incriminated more than once for the commission of a
single reprehensible act?"
The problem has been a recurrent one. In one early case a dispute
arose concerning jurisdiction over an American who had shot another
American in Canada, with death occurring in the United States. The
double jeopardy question was never litigated as such because the
Canadian officials dropped their demands for extradition once the
Michigan courts had agreed to hear the case.76
The problem of double jeopardy in international law is often avoided
by the use of treaties waiving American claims of jurisdiction.77 The
Supreme Court held, as early as 1820, that a criminal prosecution in
the courts of another nation would bar prosecution in the United
States federal courts.78 Since at least the year 1662, England has
followed the same rule.7 9 The jurisdictional boundaries between
nation states have not been given legal significance sufficient to permit
double prosecution. It does not matter that several nations have the
ability to try a particular defendant. American courts will not try him
if he has been tried by courts of another nation. One may ask: "If
American courts can trust foreign courts, is it too much to expect them
to trust each other?"8 "
Similar situations frequently arise in conflicts between the states of
the federal union. In discussing the effect of the concurrent jurisdic-
tion of Washington and Oregon over the Columbia River, the Supreme
Court said that "the one first acquiring jurisdiction of the person may
prosecute the offense, and its judgment is a finality in both states, so
that one convicted or acquitted in the courts of one state cannot be
prosecuted for the same offense in the courts of the other."81 Thus,
76. Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 320 (1860).
77. See Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime,
29 AM. J. INrr' L. 435 (Supp. 1935), Article 13 provides:
"In exercising jurisdiction under this Convention, no State shall prosecute or punish
an alien after it is proved that the alien has been prosecuted in another State for a
crime requiring proof of substantially the same acts or omissions ... "' But see Rocha
v. United States, 288 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1961).
78. United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820).
79. R. V. Thomas, I Sid. 179, 1 Lev. 118 (1662).
80. Franck, An International Lawyer Looks at the Bartkus Rule, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv.
1096, 1103 (1959).
8]. Nielsen v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315, 320 (1909).
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as a matter of federal policy, duplicating prosecutions are eliminated
and the criminal defendant protected.
In like fashion, the question of federal jurisdiction over crimes
committed on the Great Lakes raises double jeopardy problems of a
jurisdictional nature. In a recent case, the court indicated that federal
jurisdiction had been extended over the Great Lakes regardless of
state jurisdiction and exists even if a state has already prosecuted the
offender. But when a crime is committed on a tributary of the Great
Lakes, the federal court will have jurisdiction only when a state court
does not claim it. Federal criminal jurisdiction seems to depend on the
statutes and location of the vessel. Federal admirality law would be
applied to vessels plying the Great Lakes, as on the "high seas.""
The most famous and most important jurisdictional line is that
drawn between state and federal criminal law by the case of United
States v. Lanza.83 This case held that persons illegally transporting
liquor in violation of a state and federal prohibition law may be
prosecuted separately by each authority for violating the law of each.
The case treated the question of the constitutionality of a federal
prosecution following a completed state prosecution, but on grounds so
broad as to include the reverse situation. It was ruled that two sep-
arate sovereignties which derive their power from separate sources
each have the power to punish the same criminal activity. Each could
deal with the same subject matter without interference from the other
because each should determine what conduct offends its own peace
and dignity.
The double jeopardy clause was held inapplicable since it only
restricted federal prosecutions. There had been only one prosecution
for the violation of the laws incident to its sovereignty. Similarly, the
state double jeopardy provision referred only to the state prosecution.
The decision had the effect of placing the significance of the federal-
state relationship on a higher plane than the interest against double
prosecutions.
Dean Roscoe Pound has criticized the Lanza rule because it is "an
easy way for prosecutors to make a record for convictions with a
minimum of effort."M Professor J. A. C. Grant has led the scholarly
attack on the decision. Professor Grant maintains that the Lanza
case is clearly incorrect on historical grounds, wrong in its interpreta-
tion of the English and American case law, wrong because of its
82. Hoopengarner v. United States, 270 F.2d 465 (6th Cir. 1959). This was based
on United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249 (1893), except that in Rodgers the offense
occured on the Canadian side of the Detroit River.
83. 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
84. Pound, Cooperation in Enforcement of Law, 17 A.B.A.J. 9, 14 (1931).
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inherent contradictions, and wrong on policy grounds. 85 Grant points
out that extension of the rule has led to the possibility of triple trials
for the same conduct-by the federal government, by the state, and
by the municipality. 6
The Lanza rule has been consistently followed in the few cases
in which it has been tested.8 7 Recently, the federal preemption doc-
trine of the Nelson caseP cast slight doubt upon its viability. The
Court in the Nelson case took pains to distinguish Lanza in its holding
that the Smith Act superseded the enforceability of a state act
proscribing conduct aiding the forcible overthrow of the government.
This area of criminal conduct was reserved to the control of the
federal government as an area of national concern, the federal govern-
ment having preempted the field by the enactment of the Smith Act.
The Nelson case was intended to be exceptional, as subsequent deci-
sions have emphasized. Generally, federal and state criminal powers
are considered as co-equal.
If there was any doubt created in the Nelson ruling, it was dispelled
by the recent Bartkus8 case which concerned a situation factually the
reverse of the Lanza case. In this recent decision the defendant was
convicted in a state prosecution which followed a prior federal
acquittal, based on substantially the same offense and the same
evidence. The Court held, by a five to four vote, that there was no
double jeopardy bar to such a threat of double punishment. The
decision was justified "in the name of federalism," asserting that it
would be in derogation of the federal system to permit the reserved
power of the states to be displaced by federal prosecution of minor
federal offenses. The majority displays its motives, stating: "Some
recent suggestions that the Constitution was in reality a deft device
85. Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive Prosecutions, 32 CoLum. L. REv. 1309,
1317 (1932). As Grant points out, the Supreme Court had declared, at first, that
passage of a national criminal act would necessarily render the state law unenforceable.
See Houston v. Morre, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820). It would have been in accord
with international law and the logic of previous decisions to have applied the double
jeopardy principle in the Court's first case of successive state and federal prosecutions.
But instead the Court created, in United States v. Lanza, the "novel doctrine that
dual offenses arise merely from the existence of duplicate laws." Grant, Successive
Prosecutions by Stdte and Nation: Common Law and British Empire Comparisons,
4 U.C.L.A. L. Rxv. 1, 4 (1956). Grant goes on to demonstrate that the inconsistency
of this rule is based upon an incorrect and unjustifiable interpretation of the common
law and of the relevant cases in the United States. He points out, very skilfully,
that Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847), upon which Lanza claims to be
based, is completely misconstrued by the Lanza Court. Grant accuses the Solicitor
General and the defense counsel of not having studied the history of the problem.
86. Grant, Penal Ordinances and the Guarantee Against Double Jeopardy, 25 Gxo.
L.J. 299 (1937).
87. Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1 (1927).
88. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
89. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
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for establishing a centralized government are . . . without factual
justification"9 0 hinting that the fears raised by some writers of a
possible extension of the Nelson rule could be laid to rest.
Criticism of this decision was outspoken. A leading English journal
criticized the view of federalism espoused by the case on the ground
that "Justice Franlfurter's opinion . . . seemed sometimes to view
federalism as an end in itself, not as a means to a better life for
individuals."91 In its practical impact, the decision opened the door
to increased cooperation between federal and state prosecutors to the
detriment of defendants. Some procedural devices have been sug-
gested to avoid the possible harsh results.92
It seems evident that the majority in Bartkus did not have to decide
as a matter of federalism that state and federal prosecutions for the
same offense do not offend double jeopardy. The reserved powers
of the state to determine its criminal laws are not threatened by
the application of double jeopardy. The effective use of a double
jeopardy plea would not nullify any state laws.
On the other hand, federal-state relations have been on a partic-
ularly difficult footing since the Nelson decision. The feelings of state
officials are as important as the reality of the situation. In such a
circumstance it is not surprising that concern with federalism would
prevail over the right to plead double jeopardy. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter was faced with a conflict between the fifth and tenth amend-
ments and sensitively preferred the latter, an act of judicial statesman-
ship.
Mr. Justice Brennan, writing in Abbate v. United States,93 a com-
panion case to Bartkus, discerned the policy issues at stake. He
thought that the danger of multiple prosecution was outweighed by
the necessities of the federal system which would otherwise permit a
defendant to get off lightly if the state or federal penalty were
minor.94 Whatever the merits of these arguments, it seems undesirable
to reverse in the criminal area the achievements of Erie v. Tompkin9
5
in the civil area. There is no federal common law for civil cases,
neither should there be a preeminent federal criminal law. Double
jeopardy must give way.
90. Id. at 137.
91. Conflicts in Court, 1959 THE ECONOMIST 233. The article stresses the division
between Frankfurter and Black; the former guided by respect for the political branches
of government, the latter by individual rights.
92. Note, 45 COaNELL L.Q. 574, 579 (1960), proposes negotiation between sovereign-
ties, preemptive exclusion, calculation of primary interests, and direct legislative action.
None of these seem likely to take place in the foreseeable future .
93. 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
94. Id. at 195.
95. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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The line between civil and criminal law is an important one in
double jeopardy law. The federal cases are in conflict on the abstract
question of whether a defendant's former acquittal or conviction of a
criminal charge bars a civil action against him to recover a statutory
penalty for the same course of conduct. The modem federal view is
probably that a former acquittal or conviction will not bar a subse-
quent civil suit.96 The attempt to reconcile differing case results has
been made in terms of a distinction based upon the nature of the
penalty. The distinction rests on whether the penalty was intended to
be criminal in nature.
97
Under some circumstances, a civil action to recover taxes may
amount to a criminal action because of the nature of the punishment.98
The distinction can be made on the basis of the statutory exaction
between the compensatory or punitive nature of the statute. In some
cases neither the defense of double jeopardy nor the defense of res
judicata will avail a defendant. This is true under the Federal False
Claims Acts.99
A suit on behalf of the United States to recover treble damages
under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942100 was considered to
be a civil action involving no double jeopardy.101 Acquittal on a
criminal charge is not a bar to a civil action by the government which
is remedial in nature, arising out of the same facts on which the
criminal proceedings were based.l °a Double jeopardy does not apply
to drug misbranding proceedings.1 3 A contumacious witness may be
punished for contempt of the United States Senate for a refusal to
testify after being subpoenaed, and separately indicted for a misde-
meanor for each refusal.1°4 Imposition of the civil sentence for the
96. Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956); United States ex rel.
Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
Contra, United States v. Ulrici, 102 U.S. 612 (1881); United States v. Gates, 25 Fed.
Cas. 1263 (No. 15,191) (S.D.N.Y. 1845). This seems a tenuous distinction, at best,
since it would imply that any money damages not related to actual damages caused
are punitive; hence the proceeding is criminal.
97. Helvering v. Mitchell, supra note 96. United States v. Ben Grunstein & Sons,
127 F. Supp. 907 (D.N.J., 1955).
98. United States v. LaFranca, 282 U.S. 568 (1931).
99. United States ex rel. Ostrager v. New Orleans Chapter, Associated Gen. Con-
tractors, Inc., 317 U.S. 562 (1943).
100. Emergency Price Control Act, 56 Stat. 33 (1942), as amended, 58 Stat. 640
(1944), as amended, 60 Stat. 676 (1946), as amended, 61 Stat. 619 (1947).
101. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, supra note 96.
102. Stone v. United States, 167 U.S. 178 (1897).
103. United States v. 42 Jars . . . Bee Royale Capsules, 160 F. Supp. 818 (D.N.J.
1958).
104. In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897). Doubt was cast upon the availability
of a double jeopardy defense, on the peculiar ground that a prosecution through
Congress" own process was not the same as statutory prosecution since each is com-
mitted "against different jurisdictions."
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refusal is no barrier to criminal punishment because "the civil and
criminal sentences served distinct purposes, the one coercive, the
other punitive and deterrent; that the same act may give rise to these
distinct sanctions presents no double jeopardy problem."10 5 Obviously,
an in rem proceeding is not a criminal action and will not be accorded
double jeopardy protection.10
The federal courts have made conscious policy judgments in this
area of drawing the line between the civil and criminal areas. The
difficulty arises with the use of indefinite terms in order to determine
whether a statute is "coercive," "deterrent," "remedial, .... compensa-
tory," or whatever phrase the court may employ as an aid in de-
limiting the civil from the criminal. There is an element of artificiality
in the use of these concepts, but they are not entirely lacking in
meaningful content.
1 7
There is considerable doubt whether the fifth amendment double
jeopardy provision is a requirement in military courts-martial. It is
clear that a soldier committing a crime in a jurisdiction governed by
federal law cannot be tried by a federal court if he has been previously
exonerated at a court-martial.108 It is very uncertain just how far this
principle can be extended.10 9 Thus, double jeopardy protection is
not accorded with any certainty in cases overlapping the military-
civil jurisdictional lines. The federal courts seem to have developed
no sure policy, nor even a consistent attitude, towards the problems
inherent in the conflicts of courts-martial with criminal law."0
105. Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66 (1957).
106. Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577 (1931).
107. An example of decisive policy making in double jeopardy is to be found in
United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 (1951), in which a defendant's acquittal in a
criminal prosecution was held not to bar a subsequent prosecution for perjury com-
mitted at his former trial on the ground that to decide otherwise would permit a de-
fendant testifying on his own behalf to swear to anything he pleased.
108. Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907); United States v. Block 262
Fed. 205 (D. Ind. 1920).
109. The question of whether the fifth amendment may be invoked in cases arising
in the military was unanswered in earlier decisions. See Carter v. McClaughry, 183
U.S. 365 (1902); Wrublewski v. McInerney, 166 F.2d 243 (9th Cir. 1948). It does not
now seem to be a requirement in courts-martial. Wade v. Hunter, Warden, 336
U.S. 684 (1949). The Supreme Court has never .squarely decided the question of
whether the sentence of a court-martial is void, and subject to habeas corpus attack
merely because the accused was twice placed in jeopardy. It has been assumed that
the federal courts may find a court-martial void for double jeopardy reasons where
the former conviction, or acquittal, was in a federal court, since both courts are courts
of the same sovereign, but this is only a surmise. See United States ex rel. Pasella v.
Fenno, 76 F. Supp. 203 (D. Conn.), aff'd., 167 F. 2d 593 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 806 (1948). The lower federal courts are completely at odds and confused
about these problems. Compare Sanford v. Robbins, 115 F. 2d 435 (5th Cir. 1940),
with Ex parte Henkes, 267 Fed. 276 (D. Kan. 1919).
110. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957);
Schubert sees a fundamental constitutional trend toward the use of judicial review in
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If the diverse double jeopardy situations are meaningfully grouped
together as problems of policy line-drawing in matters of overlapping
jurisdiction, some deficiencies become apparent. Inconsistencies which
could be removed from double jeopardy law detract from its signifi-
cance as a constitutional protection. The federal courts can remedy
these defects by a more direct confrontation of the genuine policy
issues.
V. ScopE oF THE CRnMNAL Aer
The problem of the multiple consequences of a criminal act and of
the multiple prosecutions which might be accorded those single acts
is the central problem in the double jeopardy area, especially since it
is the most commonly contested double jeopardy claim. Confusion is
rampant in this branch of double jeopardy law. But before the
confusion can be dissipated, the separate and distinct nature of the
problem must be perceived.
The first strand which must be disentangled from the skein is
the problem of the effect of appeal from the judgment of the trial
court. This is patently a different question than the scope of the
criminal act, the problem now at hand. Yet, the federal courts have
tended to treat these problems alike, often using the same language as
rationale.
A single criminal act may present the prosecution with opportunities
for securing a conviction under several penal statutes which, even
though they may overlap and even though they punish conduct of a
single sort, provide alternative legal theories on which conviction may
be obtained."' To complicate the picture further, a single criminal act
may injure several persons or things, multiplying the possibilities of
conviction. Beyond this, the prosecution has the option of joining
the violations as counts in a single indictment before a single jury,
or of splitting the violations into separate indictments before several
juries. 12
Obviously, double jeopardy objections are sure to arise, but how
are the courts to resolve them? For the federal system, the Supreme
Court and circuit courts have evolved a completely fictitious series
of tests: the "same offense," "same evidence," "same transaction," and
this general area, notably in United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
This may be seen in "scalograms" in ScuBERT, CoNsrruTioNAL PoLrrics 204-05
(1960).
111. See Horack, The Multiple Consequences of A Single Criminal Act, 21 MiNN.
L. REv. 805 (1937).
112. This is explored in interesting fashion by Kirchenheimer, The Act, the Offense,
and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J. 513 (1949). Kirchenheimer considers the state and
federal law together. Indeed, the problems are the same, although a bit different in the
significance accorded to double jeopardy itself. Still, the same formulae are employed.
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the "same act" tests. The result of the use of these convenient fictions
has been to add contradictory and unpredictable elements to double
jeopardy law.
The great range of choices presented the prosecution is due to the
multiplication of legislatively-created criminal categories. Every new
criminal statute further extends the alternatives available to the prose-
cution while increasing the number of possible convictions and
sentences which a defendant may suffer. A deed which might have
violated one criminal proscription in 1800 may violate five today.
Thus, the problem is partly one of legislative interpretation. It must
be determined whether the legislature "intended" to increase the
penalty for a single criminal deed, merely to provide another alterna-
tive remedy, or to make criminal actions which were previously legal.
Traditionally, the courts have had the task of determining legislative
intent. All too often courts must assume that a conscious policy exists
where there is none. They must read criminal statutes to discover
whether they are "intended" impliedly to repeal or to add to the
criminal punishment meted out to a particular activity. This is no
easy task. One judge astutely complained:
The areas in which the legislator has attempted to carve out several
offenses from one transaction by varying the legal description so as to em-
brace all varieties and stages of performance, have created in those areas, a
host of semi-independent, yet generally identical offenses.' 113
The courts have great difficulty with the problem of multiple
punishments, leading to considerable confusion:
The confusion in the decisions is intelligible only as an expression of con-
flicting views on the desirability of leaving an absolute discretion with the
trial court. It is not difficult to understand the considerations which have
led many courts to inspect the record carefully and to restrict the use of
consecutive sentences.114
Normally, the courts will not examine probable legislative intent in
situations where new crimes and subdivided old crimes accumulate
and apply to the same facts."5 In the absence of repeal, a legislative
intent appears to make all such provisions cumulatively applicable."'
Congress may separate a conspiracy to commit a substantive offense
from the commission of the offense and affix to each a different
113. District of Columbia v. Buckley, 128 F.2d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
114. Note, 45 Hnv. L. 1Ev. 533, 540 (1932).
115. Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906).
116. Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160 (1947).
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penalty."17  Only if the substantive offense and the conspiracy "are
identical" does a conviction for both constitute double jeopardy.",8
In actuality, the courts cannot merely defer to legislative judgment.
The task of interpretation cannot be evaded.
The dilemma is best revealed by the example of a recent case,
Gore v. United States,"9 where the defendant violated at least three
statutes by one criminal act: (1) selling narcotics without a written
order; (2) selling in a container other than the original stamped
package; and (3) facilitating the concealment and sale of narcotics.
By a five to four decision, the majority accepted these similar offense
categories as separate offenses. Mr. Justice Douglas entered a vigorous
dissent, saying, "I think it is time that the Double Jeopardy Clause was
liberally construed in light of its great historic purpose to protect the
citizen from more than one trial for the same act."120
The federal courts have developed interpretive aids to solve pre-
sumed legislative intent. Actually, these tests take the place of
conscious policy and provide an arbitrary device to solve the dilemma
of overlapping offenses. Even those jurists who prefer not to be
legal activists must assert the court's role of interpretation and crea-
tion of law.
One test which is employed is the "same evidence"'test. Where the
act constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test
to determine whether there are two offenses or one is whether either
statute requires proof of facts which the other does not. 121 In cases
involving two violations of congressional enactments, the test would
be whether the two offenses are distinguishable by requiring some-
what different evidence in proving each. 22
Drawing from this rule, it has been said that a person may not be
117. United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532 (1947); Pinkerton v. United States,
328 U.S. 640 (1946). In a relatively recent decision, Mr. Justice Frankfurter discussed
the underlying policy considerations, saying: "We attribute to Congress a tacit purpose
-in the absence of any inconsistent expression-to maintain a long-established distinc-
tion between offenses essentially different" and "this settled principle derives from
the reason of things in dealing with socially reprehensible conduct: collective criminal
agreement-partnership in crime-presents a greater potential threat to the public than
individual delicts ...... Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587 (1961). Similarly,
separate convictions for a conspiracy to monopolize trade do not amount to double
jeopardy, since they are separate statutory offenses, each punishable as separable viola-
tions of the Sherman Act. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781
(1946). The courts may uphold attempts to punish as two conspiracies, under separate
counts in a single indictment, that which amounts to one conspiracy for the removal
of liquor from a bonded warehouse. See Murphy v. United States, 285 Fed. 801 (7th
Cir. 1923).
118. Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169 (1958).
119. 357 U.S. 386 (1958).
120. Id. at 396.
121. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
122. Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911).
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tried for first degree murder and, after acquittal, be tried for man-
slaughter.m But the "same evidence" test, in requiring that the second
accusation utilize substantially the same evidence in order for the
defendant to have the benefit of double jeopardy protection, is a
very narrow view of double jeopardy. This interpretive rule amounts
to a broad grant of discretion to the prosecutor. Accordingly, the test
has often been qualified by the use of res judicata and the "lesser
included offense" doctrine. 2 4
Another frequently employed but narrower test is the "same offense"
test which requires a plea of double jeopardy to be based upon a
prosecution for the same offense.'25 The test of identity of offenses
is whether there is a separate definition in the statutes. One court
added to the confusion by ruling that the test of the identity of the
offenses is whether the same evidence is required to sustain both
charges,2 6 a common error. 27
Until quite recently, the "same offense" dogma has been a very
popular one.128 In its best phraseology, the Supreme Court has de-
clared: "A single act may be an offense against two statutes, and if
each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does
not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt
the defendant from prosecution and punishment under the other."2O
In a 1955 case, however, the Court decided that so far as the
Mann Act was concerned, the single offense doctrine did not apply.-10
This case may indicate the Supreme Court's distaste for the "same
offense" rule.
The "same transaction" test seems to have been applied in an 1897
case which has never been overruled.131 This generous test would
forbid a new trial based on any occurrence which may be said to
arise out of the same criminal transaction. Some of the circuit courts
seem to have adopted this rule as their guide in the double jeopardy
area.132 In so doing, they have relied upon dicta appearing in the
case of Holiday v. Iohnson.'3 The "same transaction" test is favorable
to the defendant, since it permits a second prosecution only in cases
123. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
124. See Kirchenheimer, supra note 112, at 527-530.
125. Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906).
126. Morgan v. Devine, 237 U.S. 632 (1915).
127. See Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1 (1927).
128. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163 (1873).
129. Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 395 (1901).
130. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955).
131. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
132. Goetz v. United States, 39 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1930); Tritico v. United States,
4 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1925).
133. 313 U.S. 342 (1940).
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in which the proof does not show that the second case concerns the
same criminal transaction as the first.
The "same act" test is not easy to isolate as a separate criterion, and
is usually posed as a rationale with other tests. No significant Supreme
Court case may be found dealing with this point. A similar but
vaguer test has been developed by lower courts under the hazy guise
of a "common essential element" test.M
Lower federal courts have been given no guide by the Supreme
Court to resolve this problem in double jeopardy. In this bewildering
situation some circuit courts, as indicated above, have adopted the
"same transaction" test. Others employ the "same offense" test or some
intermediate variation. A few courts have discovered an almost unique
formula: "A plea of double jeopardy is unavailing unless the offense
to which it is interposed is precisely the same in law and in fact as a
former one relied upon under the plea."135 This test is almost formless
and is of little value.
This important area of double jeopardy law seems to be largely in
the hands of the trial judge. He is left relatively free to employ the
test of his choice and his decision is usually affirmed. This is due to the
intangible nature of the tests and the flexibility of their application. 36
The Supreme Court has failed to set a policy in this branch of the law.
In cases in which a single physical movement has produced several
statutory violations, the "single act, .... single transaction," "same of-
fense," and "same evidence" rules have been used more as a justifica-
tion and rationalization of desired results than as an analytical tool.
The same tests appear again in cases in which a single physical
movement has produced several successes. 137 In this area one event
injures more than one person or object and the question arises as to
the number of theories which are to be made available to the prosecu-
tion. In one decision in which the defendant was charged with violat-
ing the Mann Act by transporting two different women across state
lines for immoral purposes, it was held that only one offense had been
committed which could not be subjected to cumulative punishment
under two separate counts.'1
In Ladner v. United States, the defendant wounded two federal
134. Copperthwaite v. United States, 37 F.2d 846 (6th Cir. 1930); Lewis v. United
States, 4 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1925).
135. Bartlett v. United States, 166 F.2d 928, 931 (10th Cir. 1948).
136. Jones, What Constitutes Double Jeopardy? 38 J. CGmn. L., C. & P.S. 379, 385
(1947). This article gives a good brief summary of traditional double jeopardy ap-
proaches, but is not analytical.
137. Of course, the problem is really more fundamental, requiring formal restrictions
on the prosecution as a matter of policy. Now the courts each set the policy for them-
selves. The language of the tests is similar, but policy decision is really quite different
in this sub-area.
138. Bell v. United States, supra note 130.
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revenue agents with what was alleged to have been a single shotgun
blast. The Court held that there was no constitutional issue presented.
The question for decision was the construction of a section of the
criminal code, which section was interpreted by the court "to mean
that the single discharge of the shotgun would constitute an 'assault'
without regard to the number of federal officers."'- The Court avoided
the double jeopardy issue by adopting a policy of deference in inter-
preting the statute, asserting that when choice is to be made between
two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is ap-
propriate that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear
and definite.
This approach of direct statutory interpretation is more forthright
than the use of the double jeopardy tests. Since most of the problems
have been created by multiplicity of criminal legislation, this approach
discerns the policy issue. However, it does not necessarily solve the
problems better than fictional tests.
VI. USE OF THE CumirNA APPEAL
The final aspect of double jeopardy law to be treated is the effect
of an appeal by the defendant or the state upon the issues to be
litigated at the new trial. This is to be sharply distinguished from
the situation treated in the preceding section which was concerned
with an entirely different criminal suit, connected with the first only
by virtue of the similarity of facts. The problem of appeal is less
delicate since it may be said that the voluntary appeal of the defendant
has provided the prosecution with a "second crack" at a conviction.
Appeals by the federal government are extremely unusual and are
looked upon with disfavor by the Supreme Court.140 Congress has
enacted laws granting the prosecution a right of appeal in criminal
cases and such legislation is not directly violative of any constitu-
tional prohibition. 141 A provision of the Criminal Appeals Act of 1907
states that if a demurrer or a motion to quash an indictment is sus-
tained when a federal statute is construed or its validity is denied, the
government may then bring the matter of its construction and validity
directly to the Supreme Court.'4
One early case held that the prohibition against double jeopardy
applies equally whether the defendant has been acquitted or con-
139. 358 U.S. 169 (1958).
140. Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394 (1957); Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331
344-45 (1955) (appears even stronger).
141. United States v. Heinze, 218 U.S. 532 (1910); United States v. Bitty, 208
U.S. 393 (1907); United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310 (1892); United States v.
Janitz, 161 F.2d 19 (3d Cir. 1947).
142. Act of March 2, 1907 ch. 2564, § 587, 34 Stat. 1246. Upheld in United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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victed. No exception to the applicability of the double jeopardy
clause would be made merely because the new trial had been
sought by the defendant for his own benefit.143 The problem is nar-
rowed to the question of the limitation upon the second indictment.'44
One of the first formulas to be developed was the "lesser included
offense" doctrine. This doctrine states that acquittal or conviction of
a greater offense is not a bar to subsequent conviction of a minor
offense included within the former whenever, under the indictment for
the greater offense, the defendant could have been convicted of the
lesser. But if the lesser offense is tried first, this will be a bar to the
greater charge on the new trial. Although one-half the states have
accepted this defendant-oriented doctrine, or some portion of it,
many others have not.145 The Supreme Court has not expressed its
attitude on the matter, but lower federal courts apply the doctrine on
occasion. In Goodall v. United States,'4 an appellate court held that
second degree murder is a lesser offense which can be proven under a
charge of felony-murder.
A more troublesome, and more frequently used test is the "waiver"
rule. This doctrine rests upon the theory that when a new trial is
granted, the defendant is in the same position as if there had been
no trial and thus cannot plead his prior conviction as double jeopardy.
He is, in effect, held to have waived the plea of former jeopardy by
his appeal.
The Supreme Court ruled in 1905, in passing upon a case arising
under a Philippine statute prohibiting the infliction of double jeopardy,
that by appealing a conviction for assault the defendants had waived
the right to plead double jeopardy in a new trial for the charge of
murder. In this famous case, Trono v. United States,"47 it was not
made clear whether the waiver doctrine was accepted as a part of
constitutional law, or was merely a matter of statutory interpretation.
Five years later the Court considered the question again. In Brant-
ley v. Georgia," it was held that the Supreme Court of Georgia could
permit a new trial for murder after an appealed conviction of man-
slaughter had been reversed without violating the fifth amendment
143. United States v. Gilbert, 25 Fed. Cas. 1287 (No. 15,204) (C.C.D. Mass. 1834).
144. Other limitations upon appeal have been set by Congress which condition the
double jeopardy situation. So far as the Supreme Court itself is concerned, only
limited criminal appeals by the government are permitted under the Criminal Appeals
Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 844, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 3731 (1949). This statute permits
direct appeal by the government from decisions or judgments setting aside an indict-
ment where the decision is based upon the invalidity of a statute.
145. See compilation by Frankfurter, J., in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 211
(1957).
146. 180 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
147. 199 U.S. 521 (1905).
148. 217 U.S. 284 (1910).
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double jeopardy provision. More recently, in Hill v. Texas,'14 the
Supreme Court commented that a prisoner whose conviction in a state
court is reversed by the state Supreme Court need not go free, for a
state may indict and try him again. Thus, the states are granted broad
discretion in this area.
The Trono case remained the federal law for some time. In 1919,
the Supreme Court, relying expressly upon Trono, upheld the imposi-
tion of the death penalty in a new trial following the successful appeal
of the first trial in which the jury had not recommended capital
punishment.150
Waiver of a plea of double jeopardy, however, must be a voluntary
and knowing relinquishment of rights.'5 ' In its normal meaning, the
Court has held that the word "waiver" indicates a conscious gamble;
thus it forces the defendant to choose to accept a lesser penalty or
to enter an appeal, and to take the risk that the second charge might
be much more serious.
In 1957 much of this doctrine was discarded in the important case
of Green v. United States.152 Green had been found guilty of the com-
mission of arson and second degree murder in his first trial. The jury
had made no finding as to first degree murder. The court of appeals
reversed and remanded the case for a new trial.153 On remand Green
was tried again, but this time for first degree murder, when the Court
overruled his plea of former jeopardy. The new jury found him guilty
of first degree murder and he was given the mandatory death penalty.
A divided court of appeals rejected the defense of double jeopardy and
affirmed the decision. 15 4
The Supreme Court reversed the decision, stating that the conviction
of a lesser offense is a bar to any further prosecution for the greater
offense on retrial after the appeal by the accused and reversal of the
conviction. The Government had contended that the accused had
"waived" his constitutional defense by obtaining a successful appeal
of his improper conviction.15 To condition an appeal of one offense
on a coerced surrender of a valid plea of former jeopardy on another,
however, conflicts with the constitutional bar against double jeop-
149. 316 U.S. 400 (1942).
150. Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919). Frankfurter's dissent in Green
v. United States, supra note 145, rested in part on this case. The Justice could find
no distinction between allowing a man to be retried at the risk of a greater punish-
ment, and being retried at the risk of a greater punishment for a higher crime. Stroad
v. United States was not overruled.
151. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
152. Supra note 145.
153. Green v. United States, 218 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
154. Green v. United States, 236 F.2d 708 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
155. Green v. United States, supra note 145, at 191.
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ardy.1 8' Mr. Justice Black, for the majority, distinguished the Trono
case on the ground that the defendant could not have intentionally
consented to be tried for more than was contained in the first prosecu-
tion.157 Mr. Justice Frankfurter insisted that by distinguishing Trono
the majority was really overruling it indirectly.5 8
In Forman v. United States,59 a 1960 case, the Supreme Court
demonstrated that the "waiver" doctrine of the Trono case still applied
to cases in which the new trial after defendant's appeal was for the
same offense. Although the decision rested on other grounds, there is
good reason for assuming that if the "waiver" doctrine is still viable,
it cannot be used to bar a plea of double jeopardy when the defendant
is being retried for an offense greater than that contained in the
original indictment. This means that the Green case is the most
significant precedent in this area. The policy question seems to be
in the process of being resolved so as to permit appeal free from
coercive risk.
VII. JuDicLA. BEHAVIOR IN DoUBLE JEop ADy CASES
It would be incomplete to leave the case study of federal double
jeopardy law without considering the judicial behavior aspects. In this
regard, the work of Glendon Schubert has great utility. He creates
a "scalogram" of the seven double jeopardy decisions of the Warren
court from Green v. United States in 1957 through Williams v. Okla-
homa'60 in 1959. From this he concludes: "During this brief but
relatively homogenous period, the attitudes of the justices toward the
equity of double jeopardy practices seemed to have a much more
important bearing upon their decision-making than did the constitu-
tional theories and concepts with which the opinions of the justices
are concerned." 161
Unfortunately, this study does not seem to support Schubert's con-
clusions. The Court has rather consistently applied first one, then
another series of constitutional tests. If anything, the fault has been
that insufficient consideration has been given the "equity of double
jeopardy," the policy levels which lie beneath the legal rules.
156. Id. at 193.
157. As a matter of fact, the defendant did know the possible consequences of his
appeal, but he said that he preferred death to spending the rest of his life in prison.
158. Green v. United States, supra note 145, at 213, 214.
159. 361 U.S. 416 (1960).
160. Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1959), is a case concerning the due
process meaning of double jeopardy as a restriction on the states. Like every other
such case, the fourteenth amendment was no limitation up 6n the state's interpretation
of the double jeopardy protection. The defendant, after having been convicted of
murder and sentenced to life, pleaded guilty to a kidnapping charge and was sentenced
to death.
161. Schubert, supra note 110, at 608-09.
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Schubert's analysis is more useful in locating the "swing man" on
the Court in double jeopardy questions:
The separation of the justices into two groups is rather sharply and con-
sistently defined.., the disposition of the cases is in perfect accord with the
voting of only one justice, Whittaker: and in a majority of four of the seven
cases, Whittaker's vote was determinative, which made him the equipoise
of the Court on this issue. Thus the freshman justice of the 1956 Term
became, in the decision of this set of cases, the most powerful justice on
the Court.
162
This is interesting information, even if one need not have con-
structed a scalogram to discover it. The more important issue of the
personal philosophies of the judges tends to be overlooked, however.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Several inconsistencies in federal double jeopardy law appear as a
result of this examination. First, the internal inconsistencies inherent
in the doctrine of attachment are so great that they immediately give
rise to qualifications and exceptions. The intrinsic-extrinsic formula
suggested above seems much closer to the real policy considerations
in this area. Its adoption would have solved the Gori case and similar
problems.
Second, the inconsistencies flowing from the effect of the Palko
case and subsequent failures to define due process limitations upon
state double jeopardy has increased the tendency to proliferate double
jeopardy rules. Uniformity itself may not be possible, especially in the
absence of uniform state procedures, but some standards could be
federally established to prevent extreme abuses, as in the Hoag
situation.
Third, the problem of conflicting jurisdictional zones, as it has been
denoted here, must be seen as separate from other double jeopardy
problems. The delineation between zones should be made after
conscious deliberation and not by means of unconscious traditional
distinctions. Better drafting of statutes to indicate their civil or
criminal nature would help relieve the courts of the task of guessing
at legislative intent.
Fourth, the central confusion surrounding the problem of the scope
of the criminal act is so serious that it requires a more exhaustive
treatment. Here, too, presumptions of legislative intent have
been utilized by the courts, except that the resort to tests
of jeopardy has introduced even greater artificiality. Many of these
problems would be removed by better legislative drafting, but what
is primarily needed is a more complete consideration of the social
162. Id. at 607-69.
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policies which underlie double jeopardy. In the absence of a broad
legislative reconsideration, a single standard should be applied by
courts. This would help remove some of the uncertainties in this
problem area.
Fifth, the question of the impact of the defendant's appeal should be
resolved in such a way that the defendant would not be forced to
gamble with his future. Although the Green case is a long step in
this direction, conflicting precedents still exist which retain some
force. This resolution cannot be accomplished by the courts alone.
But the dominant policy issue in double jeopardy is that of the
extent of the defendant's protection against state prosecution, repre-
sented by the power of the state prosecutor. How many times should
the prosecution be permitted a chance to proceed against a criminal
defendant? The answer is not simple, especially since the prosecution's
advantages are offset somewhat by the burden of overturning the
presumption of the defendant's innocence. The language of the double
jeopardy clause is definite, if not clear. Ultimately, courts and legisla-
tures must decide if this doctrine is absolute or conditional.
As it is now, the outcome of a double jeopardy plea in the federal
courts is not always predictable. Even where it is relatively certain,
the legal rule seems often unrelated to any conscious social goal.
History will not cure the deficiencies of law. The social policy of
double jeopardy requires a more conscious consideration by Congress
and the federal courts.
